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From the Mosque to the Polls: The 
Emergence of the Al Nour Party in Post-
Arab Spring Egypt 
 
LAURENCE DESCHAMPS-LAPORTE* 
 
 
Abstract In this paper, I examine the rise of the Al Nour Salafi party that won 27 percent of the 
vote in the 2011 Egyptian parliamentary elections. I present a new explanation for their 
popularity based on the analysis of ethnographic data collected in Alexandria. I question the 
prevalent explanation that Al Nour’s rise is mainly due to the party’s active response to the 
socioeconomic grievances of the marginalized poor, who are more susceptible to indoctrination 
by radical religious parties. I demonstrate its limitations by highlighting the scarce evidence that 
Al Nour carries out significant charity work. Also, while some of its supporters express 
socioeconomic grievances, Al Nour voters represent different social classes. I present an 
alternative explanation based on social movement theory paired with Bourdieu’s theory of 
habitus and argue that the Al Nour politicians disseminate and promote a discourse of Salafi 
social justice and leverage it to rally supporters. Already exposed to the Salafi habitus, Muslims 
who attend mosques controlled by the Da’wa Salafiyya are encouraged to extend their religious 
practices into actions in support of the party. To nuance this analysis, I also briefly discuss the 
motives of Salafi subgroups that are not necessarily active within Al Nour, such as Salafi women. 
While they are embedded in a similar Salafi habitus, they usually embrace different discursive 
practices and choose to remain outside of politics. 
 
 
[Editor’s Note: A version of this paper won the New Middle Eastern Studies Best Paper 
Competition at the 2013 BRISMES Graduate Section Conference.] 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The Egyptian revolution that brought down Hosni Mubarak’s regime on 25 January 2011 has 
taken many unpredictable turns over the past three years. Arguably the most surprising of these 
was the military coup of July 2013 in which President Mohammed Morsi, the Muslim 
Brotherhood leader who had been elected in June of 2012, was forced from power. But while at 
the start of the revolution the return of military rule was completely unimaginable, it is easy to 
forget how most observers were also taken aback by the early electoral success of Islamist 
parties associated with the Muslim Brotherhood and the Da’wa Salafiyya (it translates as ‘Call to 
Salafism’, i.e. call for new believers). In fact, most commentators expected that the Arab Spring 
revolutions would bring new secular political parties to power.
1
 Instead, the results of the 
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Egyptian parliamentary elections of 2011-2012 showed that Islamist parties have much stronger 
support than their secular counterparts in contemporary Egypt. It should be noted that the 
Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt deemed the election results unconstitutional in a 
controversial judgement which dissolved the parliament. However, this does not undermine the 
fact that the electoral performance of Al Nour, the party of the Da’wa Salafiyya whose name 
means ‘the light’,2 is a testament to its popularity across Egypt. The Freedom and Justice Party 
(FJP), the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, topped the poll with 36 percent of the 
votes, while Al Nour came second with 27 percent. This was, arguably, the most astonishing 
result of the election.
3
 While much scholarly attention has been paid to the Muslim Brotherhood, 
which was founded in Egypt 80 years ago,
4
 the Salafis and Al Nour have been understudied in 
academia thus far.
5
 Also, the limited media reporting on Al Nour and its members has often 
failed to provide in-depth analysis of the party’s organization and political goals. In this paper, I 
explore the party’s appeal in Egypt and, more specifically, why individuals affiliate with the 
party and how it mobilized its supporters. I analyze ethnographic data collected in Alexandria, 
the stronghold of Al Nour.
6
 
Although many observers were surprised by the success of Al Nour, the party’s electoral 
performance could have been anticipated by mosque-goers in Alexandria’s neighborhoods given 
the history of Da’wa Salafiyya, which has been active in Alexandria since the 1970s. Scholars 
such as Revkin
7
 and journalists such as Fadel
8
 have advanced the hypothesis that Salafi 
mobilization is driven by rampant poverty and marginalization in Egypt. This proposition has 
also been used to explain the popularity of Salafi parties in other Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) countries.
9
 These authors argue that communities that are excluded from the elite and 
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 Journalists focused on slogans such as “our revolution is civil; neither violent, nor religious” heard in Tahrir 
Square as Asef Bayat “Egypt, and the post-Islamist Middle East”. Open Democracy, February 8, 2011. 
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2
 The Da'wa Salafiyya is the most influential Salafi religious organization in Alexandria. 
3
 I present data sourced from the Egyptian Electoral Commission published on “Islamist Vote". Egypt Data Blog. 
Accessed May 23, 2012. http://www.ducoht.org/. Note that the newspapers Al Ahram and Misr Al-Youm cited by 
Stéphane Lacroix. “Sheikhs and Politicians: Inside the New Egyptian Salafism.” Brookings Doha Center 
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52, no. 4 (1998), pp. 551–562.;  Mohammed Zahid. The Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt’s Succession Crisis : the 
Politics of Liberalisation and Reform in the Middle East. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012). 
5
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6
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7
 Mara Revkin. “Anatomy of Egypt’s Salafi Surge.” Atlantic Council, 14 December 2010. 
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/egyptsource/anatomy-of-egypts-salafi-surge. 
 
8
 Leila Fadel. “Salafis in Egypt,” National Public Radio. January 29, 2013. 
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/islamists/article/npr-salafis-egypt. 
9
 For example by Saad Eddin Ibrahim. “Anatomy of Egypt’s Militant Islamic Groups: Methodological Note and 
Preliminary Findings.” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 12 (1980), pp. 423–453. 
New Middle Eastern Studies 4 (2014) 
3 
industrialist networks in Egypt and have acute socioeconomic grievances are motivated to 
support the Salafis. This is often based on the assumption that Al Nour has a network of charities 
utilized by the party to convert beneficiaries into voters. This argument often holds that the 
uneducated and dispossessed are more easily indoctrinated by radical religious movements such 
as Salafism, which is an assumption also promulgated by many journalists.
10
 However, my 
research has identified the serious limitations of this ‘poverty hypothesis’. While Al Nour’s 
supporters usually have socioeconomic grievances, there is little evidence that absolute poverty 
is the main factor that motivates individuals to support the party. Al Nour or the Da’wa Salafiyya 
do not carry out significant charity work.
11
 Moreover, the party does not attract only poor and 
socially excluded individuals. On the contrary, Al Nour supporters, like the subset that I have 
interviewed, come from a range of socioeconomic backgrounds.  
More broadly, I present an alternative explanation for the party’s popularity. Al Nour 
politicians have developed a discourse of Salafi social justice that resonates with a wide range of 
Islamicized Egyptians and have leveraged this discourse to rally support. This targeted discourse 
appeals to a shared feeling of discrimination among Salafis. The loci of mobilization are 
mosques controlled by the Da’wa Salafiyya where worshippers are encouraged to embrace new 
discursive practices that benefit the party and translate into political support. Many Al Nour 
politicians have also been involved in the Da’wa Salafiyya, often as preachers, and this has put 
them in a position to encourage worshippers at their mosques to extend their Salafi religious 
praxis into these more overtly political discursive practices. The supporters I interviewed were 
exposed to the Salafi habitus during their lives in Alexandria and in attending Da’wa Salafiyya 
mosques. The concept of habitus denotes beliefs or behaviors that are so engrained in a society 
or environment that they seem natural.
12
 The political discursive practices promoted by the 
leaders of Al Nour have gradually become embedded in the existing Salafi religious practices of 
Da’wa Salafiyya followers, i.e. their pre-existing habitus. Activities like voting for Al Nour, 
participating in Islamist protests, or promoting Salafism and the Al Nour party represent the next 
step of an intensely puritanical religious practice. Thus, Al Nour is the political expression of a 
well-established Salafi religious and social movement with a wide following.  
 
 
Situating the Da’wa Salafiyya and Al Nour 
 
The emergence and rise of the Da’wa Salafiyya and Al Nour is rooted in the global upsurge of 
Islamism in Alexandria which began over 80 years ago. The rise of Islamism and Salafism in 
Egypt in the late 1960s and early 1970s is due to an array of factors. One of these factors is the 
                                                 
10
 This argument regarding Salafism in Egypt is popular in media reports. See The Economist, “Dogma and Purity v 
Worldly Politics.” 20 October 2012, or Ursula Lindsey, “Ultraconservative Islamist Party Reshapes Egypt’s 
Politics.” The Daily Beast, 8 December 2011. It is also employed in academia to explain the rise of Islamism and 
Salafism in the Middle-East more generally. See Alan Richards. “Explaining the Appeal of Islamic Radicals.” 
Working Papers - Center for Global, International and Regional Studies University of California Santa Cruz, 
(2002) or Omayma Abdel-Latif. “Trends in Salafism” in Islamist Radicalisation: The Challenge for Euro-
Mediterranean Relations, ed. by Emerson, Michael, Kristina Kausch, and Richard Youngs. (Centre for European 
Policy Studies, 2009), pp. 69–86. 
11
 I will elaborate on the evidence for this claim later, but informants and discussions with different doctoral 
researchers in Egypt and with Stéphane Lacroix (Sciences Po) provide corroboration. 
12
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disenchantment with Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Arab nationalist modernization agenda.13 Islamists, 
including Salafis, became particularly active following Egypt’s defeat in the Six Day War in 
1967.
14
 The failure of Arab nationalism in Egypt provided space for the emergence of religious 
ideologies that offered new solutions to Egypt’s recurring crises. 
Another factor in the rise of these movements is the change in Anwar Sadat’s attitude 
towards such groups. In the early 1970s, Sadat lifted some of the restrictions against the 
formation of student organizations in universities, which Nasser had imposed.
15
 As soon as they 
were allowed to operate within universities, organizations like the Gama’a Islamiyya and the 
Da’wa Salafiyya experienced a surge in popularity. 16  Wickham even claims that Sadat 
encouraged the formation of Islamic student groups, hoping they would counterbalance far-left 
political forces, such as the more radical Nasserist groups.
17
 
A last explanation for the emergence of these new religious movements is their response 
to students’ relative deprivation. They offered a novel “Islamic solution” to the growing social 
distress in Egyptian universities.
18
 The student body had more than doubled in the 1970s, while 
the infrastructure of universities saw no improvement. Young adults, most of whom were first-
generation university students, faced a significant discrepancy between their professional 
aspirations and the opportunities for social advancement available upon graduation. According to 
Toth, the growing popularity of Salafi ideas in the Nasser era can also be attributed to a widely-
perceived disregard for ‘real merit’ in Egyptian society.19 University graduates of rural origins 
felt deep moral outrage against a system in which “family connections […] took precedence over 
merit”, giving wealthy westernized elites access to better opportunities.20 
The Da’wa Salafiyya had carried out its proselytization work for approximately forty 
years before its leaders decided to establish the Al Nour political party after Mubarak was ousted 
in the winter of 2011. Originally, the Da’wa Salafiyya’s primary mission was to proselytize and 
spread the Salafi brand of Islam. The transition from a Salafi religious organization to the 
formation of a political wing stirred controversy amongst the followers of the Da’wa Salafiyya. 
Some sheikhs had previously warned against either defying the ruler in place or general political 
involvement. At times, Al Nour has also assumed an unexpected stance towards other Egyptian 
political parties. Although the Salafis might have been expected to collaborate with the Muslim 
Brotherhood in post-Mubarak Egypt, for example, Al Nour has often publically opposed the FJP, 
instead aligning itself with liberal parties. More specifically, after Al Nour’s candidate for 
president in 2012 (Abu Ismail) was disqualified,  the Salafis chose to endorse the more liberal 
candidate Abol Fotouh over FJP’s Morsi. Al Nour’s message has not been consistent throughout 
the party’s existence, as it has adjusted its strategy according to its audience and its changing 
objectives. 
After the revolution, Al Nour quickly became a major political force across Egypt and 
particularly in Alexandria. In the 2011 parliamentary elections, it won over 30 percent of the 
vote in the Alexandria governorate, the second strongest performance for the party in the 
                                                 
13
 James Toth. “Islamism in Southern Egypt: A Case Study of a Radical Religious Movement.” International 
Journal of Middle East Studies 35, no. 4 (2003), pp. 547-572. 
14
 Gilles Kepel. The Prophet and Pharaoh: Muslim Extremism in Egypt. Vol. 1985. (London: Al Saqi Books, 1985). 
15
 Rachel M. Scott. The Challenge of Political Islam. 
16
 Rachel M. Scott. The Challenge of Political Islam. 
17
 Carrie Rosefsky Wickham. Mobilizing Islam. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002). 
18
 Gilles Kepel. Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. (London: I.B.Tauris, 2006), p.81. 
19
 Toth, James. “Islamism in Southern Egypt,” p. 554. 
20
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country, and its best showing in major urban centers.
21
 This makes the country’s second largest 
metropolis arguably the most appropriate setting to carry out a study of the rise of Al Nour. 
 
 
Notes on Fieldwork 
 
This paper relies primarily on ethnographic research to trace and explain the process of 
affiliation to Al Nour. The primary sub-method of this approach consisted in interviewing, but I 
also used other sub-methods, such as participant observation. I conducted open-ended interviews, 
which became more specific and structured as my fieldwork advanced. I first interviewed 
politicians at their offices or other work places, but often followed up on these interactions by 
phone or online. Meetings often developed from talking to supporters of Al Nour in the streets or 
online to gradually gaining access to a larger sample. Initially, I met rank-and-file members of 
the party in places such as street cafés (Ahwas) or by the Alexandrian Corniche (boardwalk). I 
also interviewed academics, fellow researchers, journalists, liberal activists, and Salafis involved 
in other groups. 
These interviews provided me with an array of perspectives, helped me develop a better 
understanding of Egyptian society, gave me a sense of the data available, and facilitated my 
access to other research resources. All these interactions became part of the ethnographic 
experience. The participant observation, contextual data, and Egyptian media also helped to 
enrich, corroborate or challenge my interview data. I used social media as an instrument for both 
observing interactions among Al Nour’s supporters and contacting potential informants. I created 
an authentic, but distinct Facebook account solely for the purposes of this project, in order to 
communicate with Salafis. I joined numerous Salafi Facebook groups, where I often established 
my first contact with my informants. Similarly, listening to Friday sermons from the Da’wa 
Salafiyya posted online, reading the Da’wa Salafiyya websites and posts of Alexandrian Salafis 
on Facebook and Twitter all informed my work. 
 
 
Salafi Social Justice, Poverty and Habitus 
 
While socioeconomic grievances can impact individuals’ desire to join the Da’wa Salafiyya or 
Al Nour, the main mobilization technique Al Nour politicians use is leveraging a discourse of 
Salafi social justice and promoting parallel discursive practices that are not necessarily directed 
solely at deprived individuals. This discourse is a “multi-faceted public process through which 
meanings are progressively and dynamically achieved”22  and Salafi leaders engage in it by 
disseminating discursive practices. 
Foucault asserts that analyzing discursive practices contributes to developing a better 
understanding of systems of thought. These systems of thought can be expressed as cultures or 
                                                 
21
 Al Nour won 31.3 percent of the votes in Alexandria, but in the governorate of Damietta (another northern costal 
governorate) it won 38.6 percent of the vote. (Egypt Electoral Commission data published by “Islamist Vote". Egypt 
Data Blog. Accessed May 23, 2012. http://www.ducoht.org/). Yet Alexandria is a more important urban center, as 
well as the strategic base of the party. Also note that the results of the 2011 parliamentary elections are a more 
accurate depiction of Al Nour’s influence than the 2012 presidential contest, when the party’s candidate was 
disqualified. 
22
 B. Davies and R. Harré. “Positioning: The Discursive Production of Selves.” Journal for the Theory of Social 
Behaviour, 20 (2007), pp. 43–63. 
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doctrines. He recognizes that discursive practices are not limited to the realms of logic and 
linguistics, and to comprehend systems of thought, one must also consider norms, authority, 
choices and constraints. Indeed, norms or conceptual frameworks craft dynamic discursive 
practices.
23
 Al Nour politicians, in their ‘activism of the word,’24 aim to bring a group of Salafis 
to power so as to serve as role models in terms of religious practice and behavior for the rest of 
Egyptian society. According to their vision, once in power, Salafis would be respected by all for 
their piety and the purity of their practices, reversing what they perceive as past discrimination 
and oppression. In interviews, Al Nour’s leaders claim that Salafis can only rely on their own 
politicians, as history has shown that other non-Salafi groups tend to disregard and oppress 
Salafis. This is the foundation of the discourse of Salafi social justice: past grievances can be 
redeemed through political power. To them, the state of perfect social justice would be to the 
benefit of Salafis as opposed to the Kufar, i.e. the disbelievers. This proposition demonstrates 
that Salafi social justice is exclusionist in nature and entrenched in a belief of Salafi moral 
superiority. 
Supporters of Al Nour have internalized stories of Salafi oppression, fueling mobilization 
for the party. Al Nour Salafis express a desire to defend the “rights of the Salafis in the face of 
discrimination.”25 Such discourses are not created in a vacuum, and can be traced back to one of 
the most influential Islamists ideologues in Egyptian history: Sayyid Qutb. Qutb tackled the topic 
of Islamist social justice some sixty years ago. As a founding member of the Muslim 
Brotherhood when the movement was more radical and less mainstream, he has influenced 
virtually all Islamist revivalist movements in Egypt. Qutb’s writings were passed around in 
Egyptian universities at the time when most Al Nour politicians were studying at the University 
in Alexandria. His popular book, Social Justice in Islam,
26
 is one of the likely origins of the Al 
Nour politicians’ ideology.  
Studying Qutb’s work can contribute to developing a better understanding of the 
ideological roots of Al Nour’s discourse of social justice. Still, the extent to which contemporary 
Salafi ideology emanates from his ideas is a point of contention among scholars of Salafism. 
Some consider 1970s Salafi jihadists in Egypt and Syria as Qutbists, while others claim that 
Egyptian Salafis are an early outgrowth from the Muslim Brotherhood. A third group of scholars 
argues that Salafis embrace a mixture of philosophies that includes Qutbist ideas.
27
  
Intellectual discussions of social justice, inside or outside the Islamic context, tend to 
address socioeconomic issues. Such concerns often appear in Al Nour’s policy proposals and in 
its leaders’ speeches in which they advocate wealth redistribution and disapprove of the 
accumulation of financial capital. In the minds of many observers, the prevalence of 
socioeconomic issues in these proposals has been taken as proof that the ‘poverty hypothesis’ 
accounts for Salafis’ concern with social justice. Although it is true that the Salafi discourse of 
social justice does not deny the socioeconomic aspects of social justice, it does not rest on them. 
The Al Nour politicians are more focused on spreading Salafism and ending the broader 
                                                 
23
 Michel Foucault. Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews. (Ithaca, New York: 
Cornell University Press, 1980). 
24
 James Toth examines the types of Jihad that shape Islamist movements in his article “Islamism in Southern 
Egypt.” He argues that Jihad is a 'holy struggle' but it also includes all activities and attitudes that pertain to 
activism. Toth proposes three forms of Jihad (551): (1) Jihad bi al-Qalb: activism of the heart, (2) Jihad bi al-
Kalima: activism of the word, (3) Jihad bi al-Haraka: jihad of action, which could include violence and militancy. 
25 Personal email exchange, July 23 2012. 
26
 Sayyid Qutb. Social Justice in Islam. (London: Islamic Publications International, 1999). 
27
 Roel Meijer, ed. Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement. (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2011). 
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discrimination towards their community than on securing access to economic resources. This is 
also true of Qutb’s conception of Islamic social justice which incorporates socioeconomic issues 
without giving them primacy.  
The process of affiliation to Al Nour cannot be explained only by the discourse of Salafi 
social justice. In fact, it takes roots because of an existing ‘habitus’ – “a deep structure generative 
of all thought and behavior […] that orients practice without producing it”.28 Mauss was the first 
to introduce this concept,
29
 but Bourdieu popularized it. Mauss considered that the term ‘habit’ 
inadequately described the process of the construction of the self. Instead, he used habitus, a 
concept meant to account both for the work of the individual and that of the community. For 
Mauss, habits as well as acquired abilities make up the habitus.
30
 
Recently, scholars like Mahmood and Schielke have reinterpreted Bourdieu’s conception 
of habitus in the Egyptian context. Mahmood pushed the conceptual boundaries of the term and 
looked at the habitus as an active process of shaping of the self through bodily practices such as 
rituals, attitudes, or acts such as veiling, for example.
31
 Mahmood’s application of the concept is 
useful, yet to transform a habitus into political affiliation, it needs to be further impacted by a 
specific discourse. Schielke emphasizes that “different understandings of the different 
configurations of the relationship between habitus, subject, and community can (and, in the case 
of modern Egypt, do) coexist”.32 This is true in my research where the habituation is not uniform 
for all individuals and the assimilation of Al Nour’s discursive practices is not homogenous, 
even if there are prevailing trends. More broadly, like Schielke, I consider that the habitus is the 
interaction between social beings and institutions, and it is a sort of embodied history.
33
 This 
habitus is a second nature to the believers or the ones who embrace a specific practice. 
In this Islamic context, the habitus operates as the layer of ideas and beliefs that allows 
for the development of discursive practices. It is ever-present and constructed, continually 
invigorated by Salafi TV channels, public prayers, sermons broadcast on loudspeakers from 
Salafi mosques, and the public presence of the call to prayer. Egyptian Salafis neither invented 
the prayer and the practice of ablution (wu’du), nor did they create Salafi dress. However, the 
Da’wa Salafiyya and Al Nour oriented and amplified these practices. As Bourdieu explains, 
these schemes are so engrained that they are subconscious and appear natural.
34
 Although he 
later adopted a more open-ended understanding of agency within habitus, Bourdieu generally 
predicts that social actors are governed by ‘generative schemes’ or the cultures they inhabit. For 
him, the early encounters with these structures of habitus, such as domestic tasks, morality, 
tastes, and the sexual division of labor, are structures that children are exposed to and become the 
basis of that habitus.
35
 One politician told me that all Egyptians are Salafis, because “it is in our 
                                                 
28
 Gabrielle M. Spiegel. Practicing History: New Directions In Historical Writing After The Linguistic Turn. 
(London: Psychology Press, 2005), p. 177. 
29
 Marcel Mauss. Sociologie et Anthropologie. 12th ed. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France - PUF, 2010). 
30
 Ian Burkitt. “Technologies of the Self: Habitus and Capacities.” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 32, 
no. 2 (2002), p. 225. 
31 Saba Mahmood. Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject. (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 2004). 
32
 Samuli Schielke. “Policing Ambiguity: Muslim Saints-day Festivals and the Moral Geography of Public Space in 
Egypt.” American Ethnologist 35, no. 4 (2008), pp. 539–552. 
33
 Samuli Schielke. “Being Good in Ramadan: Ambivalence, Fragmentation, and the Moral Self in the Lives of 
Young Egyptians.” Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 15 (2009), pp. 24–40. 
34
 Gabrielle M. Spiegel. Practicing History. 
35
 Pierre Bourdieu. Outline of a Theory of Practice. 
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genes”.36 This claim exemplifies some Salafis’ perception of their habitus: religious practices are 
never or at least very rarely questioned because they are seen as ‘genetic’, as if they were passed 
down for generations. 
This complex interaction of the Salafi discourse of social justice, believers’ habitus and 
discursive practices encouraged by politicians makes for a holistic theory of affiliation. This 
theory goes beyond an “overly simplistic formulation of an inexorable linkage between structural 
strains and movement contention”.37 As Bayat has argued, “the dispossessed show no more 
natural propensity toward extremism or Islamism than Islamists (notwithstanding their populist 
rhetoric) show strategic interest in the dispossessed as political player or moral target”.38 Instead, 
Salafis have been embedded in a pious environment where they have developed the Salafi 
religious habitus and have come to gradually support Al Nour. 
 
 
Politicians 
 
While Salafis’ identity and practices are rooted in a shared habitus, supporters of the Da’wa 
Salafiyya and Al Nour turn to influential politicians for orientation and guidance. Most of Al 
Nour’s leaders proselytized on behalf the Da’wa Salafiyya prior to creating or joining the party. 
They justify their work for the party mainly through a discourse of Salafi social justice. My 
research demonstrates that their involvement in the party stems from their desire to extend the 
reach of the Da’wa Salafiyya into the political realm. They often claim that founding and 
working for a political party is the most proactive approach to reestablishing a respected image 
for Salafis, which, according to them, has been tarnished during the decades-long rule of corrupt 
secular regimes. Their pursuit of social justice is a response to what they describe as grievances 
and discrimination under previous governments. Al Nour politicians are strategic actors, rather 
than dogmatic charismatic leaders. They are referred to as politicians because, unlike Al Nour’s 
other supporters and voters, they hold official positions in the party and represent the entity 
publically. Most are university-educated and display an acute awareness of their society. They 
use discursive devices to mobilize supporters and act strategically according to the opportunities 
and constraints they face,
39
 thus analyzing their discourse allows for an evaluation of their 
broader strategy. Wickham has argued that Islamist politicians and the party’s rank-and-file 
supporters have different motives for getting involved with politics as is also the case with Al 
Nour.
40
 This section presents the profiles of four Salafi politicians and illustrates the range of 
pathways into the Al Nour party structures. 
 
Emad Ghafour: The Global Charismatic Leader 
 
Until early January 2013, Emad Ghafour was Al Nour’s leader. My informants referred to him as 
"the charismatic face of Al Nour"
41
 or "Al Nour’s open door"42, and other analysts even called 
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him the Salafi liberal. It is probably due to his keen sense for politics and his charismatic public 
persona that he was selected to be the only Salafi adviser to Morsi. As one of the founders of the 
Da’wa Salafiyya in the 1970s, he was a major proponent of starting a political party forty years 
later. After the revolution, Emad Ghafour met with party secretary Yosri Hassan Hamad and 
discussed whether they wanted to support the Muslim Brotherhood, work separately as a 
pressure group or start their own party.
43
 Under Ghafour’s insistence, they rejected the first two 
propositions and chose the latter option, establishing Al Nour after the fall of the Mubarak 
regime in the spring of 2011. 
Ghafour’s charismatic nature and somewhat liberal ways have been documented by 
Lacroix, supporting the notion that he stands out from other Al Nour Salafis.
44
 Generally 
speaking, Salafi leaders are not considered as convivial or willing to have conversations with 
journalists and researchers. Ghafour is an exception to this trend. Ghafour’s time abroad, 
especially in Turkey, is also seen as a marker of ideological openness. After multiple trips to 
Turkey, he came back to Egypt only a few months before the revolution. Most Salafis have 
travelled to the more conservative Gulf countries, rather than to Turkey, which is perceived as a 
more liberal Muslim-majority country. Even though all of his colleagues, as individuals, are 
hybrids of multiple cultural and religious influences, Ghafour has arguably been exposed to a 
broader spectrum of Islamist thought than his colleagues because of his travels across the Middle 
East. He symbolizes the complex and hybrid identity of the movement. He is also a prominent 
voice promoting the discourse of Salafi social justice. At Al Nour’s first party conference, he 
declared that he “aimed to achieve social justice in all its dimensions”.45 He has also stressed that 
the negative portrayal of Al Nour in the media actually helps the party win votes and support, as 
its activists depend on this public victimization to fuel the idea of Salafi social justice.
46
 
 
Yosri Hassan Hamad: The Bureaucrat 
 
Hamad, Al Nour’s spokesperson who co-founded the party with Ghafour, was the first politician 
I met in Alexandria. Unlike his close ally Ghafour, he is not a charismatic leader, but rather a 
mild-mannered Salafi in charge of the inner workings of the party. Educated at the University of 
Alexandria medical school, he subsequently studied and practiced medicine in Kuwait. He later 
became a high-level active member of the Da’wa Salafiyya, though not reaching the position of a 
sheikh. Hamad showed his involvement in the promotion of Salafi social justice by talking at 
length about the oppression of Salafis and repeatedly expressing his belief that Al Nour is the 
most effective means for Salafis to spread their message. 
In January 2013, Ghafour and Hamad officially announced that they were leaving Al 
Nour to create a new party, Al Watan (‘the nation’). There are indications that they split off from 
Al Nour in an attempt to avoid the growing control of the Da’wa Salafiyya over their political 
activities, revealing an internal power struggle between the religious and the political 
organization. Despite this recent separation, Al Watan so far appears to have assumed political 
positions and embraced an ideology similar to Al Nour’s. Because Ghafour and Hamad were 
central to Al Nour’s parliamentary election campaign in 2011, I use the analysis of their profiles 
to interpret the dynamics of Salafi political affiliation after the fall of the Mubarak regime.  
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Tareek Shalaan: The Salafi Pragmatist 
 
When I first contacted Tareek Shalaan, he surprisingly suggested that we meet at Starbucks 
Coffee at the San Stefano Hilton Hotel in Alexandria, possibly the most ‘westernized’ and 
expensive establishment in the city. I expected, perhaps naively, to recognize him immediately 
by his beard (typical for most Salafis) and even a Galabiya (a traditional Egyptian garment). Yet, 
when he arrived, I saw a man with a shaved head, no beard and wearing a polo shirt. This 
moment shook all my preconceptions about Al Nour politicians. 
Shalaan has substantial international experience, dual citizenship - Egyptian and 
Canadian - and an engineering degree from the University of Florida. He came back to 
Alexandria after the revolution and now teaches at the American University in Cairo. Hamad 
told me that Al Nour is “looking for people with business skills, with knowledge of finance”.47 It 
appears that Shalaan joined the party at a time when it was trying to gain credibility. What are 
Shalaan’s motivations? Is he driven by pure political opportunism or does he represent a new 
type of Salafism? When I asked him about his appearance, pointing out that he does not fit the 
typical description of Salafis, he replied: “I aim to become a better Salafi every day; it is a life-
long challenge [...] the other members of the party accept my gradual embracing of all features of 
Salafism”.48 It is unlikely that Shalaan represents a new trend in Salafism, as he is the only such 
Al Nour politician that both I and other researchers in the field have encountered.
49
 All of this 
creates the impression that Al Nour was well aware of how it was perceived and concerned by its 
lack of political experience, to the point of accepting newcomers with questionable historical 
links to Salafism to the party.  
Examining Shalaan’s profile allows me to draw a distinction between political figures 
that embody the historical development of Salafism in Alexandria (such as Ghafour and Hamad), 
and politicians who have emerged more recently as the face of a new political opportunity 
structure.
50
 The opening of the Egyptian political system after the Revolution has offered the 
latter group new prospects for political involvement, without the costs imposed by the Mubarak’s 
regime. Shalaan, like the traditional leaders of Al Nour, shared the story of Salafis’ oppression 
and called for a new Salafi social order. However, he did not discuss personal experiences of 
injustice. 
 
Mohammad Mohammad: The Young Ideologue 
 
Mohammad Mohammad
51
 is a fascinating case of a younger politician active within Al Nour’s 
party apparatus yet open to discussing his personal path and involvement in detail. He is unlike 
Ghafour, Hamad and Shaalan who are professional politicians always careful not to breach the 
party line, thus making it more challenging to collect new information from them and, in 
particular, to learn about their personal stories. In contrast, Mohammad is a junior party member 
who allows himself to discuss his experiences openly. 
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Mohammad has a rich and diverse educational background, having studied commerce, 
computer engineering, and theater in Egypt. He then received two diplomas in filmmaking from 
an institute in Los Angeles and is currently pursuing for a PhD in Media Studies at the 
University of Alexandria. While he embraces Salafi values, he highlights that he is not isolated 
and has travelled widely. He explains he first came to Salafism in the US where, starting in 2004, 
he attended lectures and studied Salafi creed, jurisprudence, and philology in mosques. By 2008, 
he said that the science of Shari’ah strengthened his faith.52 
The influences that shaped his Salafi identity are global, but they were crystalized 
through his personal relationships and activities in mosques in Alexandria. Now he is a member 
of Al Nour’s ethics and media committee, and works to secure positive publicity for the Salafi 
identity in the media. To that end, he regularly contributes to films and TV shows about Salafis. 
Mohammad repeatedly congratulated me and thanked me for doing research on the subject 
because he was very concerned about the “negative image of Salafis”. He claimed that it is now 
the time to show respect for Salafis, hinting at the past repression of his community. To him, his 
Da’wa takes shape through his media projects and political involvement in the party. 
Even though Al Nour politicians have had different life paths, they share the desire to 
establish a better public image of the Salafi community and promote Salafi social justice. The 
emphasis they put on their community’s repression under earlier regimes resembles the 
grievances expressed by liberal groups that protested in Tahrir Square during the Arab Spring. 
Yet while Salafis were probably profiled before the revolution, it is difficult to ascertain the true 
extent of the oppression they experienced. In fact, both Lacroix’s research and the testimonies of 
some of my non-Salafi informants, suggest that Salafis might have actually been protected by the 
authoritarian state “which trie[d] to use Salafis to undermine the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
influence”.53 Whether the discrimination against Salafis is actual or just perceived, Al Nour’s 
politicians still use this narrative as a foundation for their social justice discourse. 
Furthermore, analyzing the profiles of these Salafi politicians makes the popular framing 
of Salafis as ideological implants from the Gulf seem slightly one-dimensional.
54
In terms of 
funding for the party more specifically, many scholars also add that Al Nour’s leaders have 
financial ties to the Gulf region, and that they are under the influence of organizations outside of 
Egypt.
55
 Al Nour’s apparent fund-raising prowess has given further credibility to these claims. 
Politicians have declared both in my interviews and to the media that most of their funding 
during the elections came from the Egyptian Da’wa Salafiyya, leading some to wonder how the 
party managed, financially speaking, to field parliamentary candidates in all electoral districts of 
Egypt. According to Lacroix, a worker in a printing press in Alexandria said that half a million 
Al Nour posters were printed in the run-up to the 2011 elections.
56
 Regarding the provenance of 
the ideology of the Salafis, Dr. Abdel Fattah Mady, a professor of political science in 
Alexandria, commented that “it is hard to know the geographical links of Salafism in Egypt, of 
course all the famous sheikhs come from the Gulf, but we do not have data specifically on 
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[Egyptian] Salafis”.57 The sheikhs he refers to are likely the ones on the Salafi TV channels. 
However, Lacroix is confident that the Gulf migration argument is overplayed when it comes to 
Al Nour’s ideological roots. Having researched Salafism in Saudi Arabia as well as in Egypt, he 
argues that, while ‘the Gulf factor’ exists, it is more subtle than one might expect. Lacroix 
acknowledges that some of the Al Nour politicians have ties to the Gulf, but challenges the 
popular argument that these individuals were migrants who were indoctrinated abroad and 
brought a foreign ideology back to Egypt. Instead, Salafis were probably attracted to travelling to 
the Gulf because of their pre-existing homegrown Salafi identity. As such, although it is still not 
clear how Al Nour is funded, the party is likely influenced by and partly financed from the Gulf. 
It is important to note, however, that the Da’wa Salafiyya is an emphatically Egyptian 
organization which is a product of both recent Egyptian history and global Islamic trends, 
constructing local discourses that have the potential to mobilize Egyptian communities.  
 
 
Supporters and their Spaces of Affiliation 
 
While most Alexandrians are exposed to the Islamic habitus through prayers, fasting, modest 
dress, almsgiving and other public religious practices, Al Nour’s supporters are exposed to its 
more intense and puritanical form - the Salafi habitus. When this conservative habitus meets the 
discourse of Salafi social justice disseminated and fostered by the Da’wa Salafiyya and Al Nour, 
it leads to political affiliation. The discourse of Salafi social justice acts as an empowering force, 
as it infuses the supporters of Al Nour with renewed pride and self-confidence. The encounter 
between habitus and discourse takes place in the mosque, in a socially comforting and hermetic 
space. However, it is important to recognize that the transformation of the Da’wa Salafiyya - a 
religious social movement - into Al Nour - a more discernible social and political movement – 
would have hardly been possible without the opportune environment of political change in post-
Arab Spring Egypt. 
The mosque appears to be the principal setting for affiliation to Al Nour, even though the 
discourse of Salafi social justice is also disseminated in other venues. Wiktorowicz’s resource 
mobilization theory,
58
 which focuses on the resources required for social movement formation, 
identifies mosques as central to Islamist mobilization. According to this theory, the emphasis on 
resources circumvents the monolithic focus on the socio-psychological strains (such as 
marginalization), which usually leads to depicting the members of movements as irrational actors 
who only rely on coping mechanisms. Wiktorowicz also suggests that the mosque has become 
important as a response to the repression by previous governments. Deemed illegal under the 
Mubarak regime and often targeted by police raids, Salafi organizations were forced to gather 
and organize in places of worship that ensured relative safety. 
The mosque is a space of praxis, where the Salafi identity is formed and solidified. Al 
Nour’s discursive practices are then taken from mosques into public spaces, and translated into 
political acts such as voting, protesting, hanging Al Nour posters, convincing others to vote for 
the party or participating in meetings. These practices become habitual and remain grounded in 
the original locus of the mosque. The stories of Mahmoud, Mustafa and Amr illustrate how 
ordinary Salafis adopt discursive practices which then lead to support for Al Nour. 
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Mahmoud 
 
My mother wore niqab, but she died when I was thirteen. My dad was the main model in 
my life. My dad raised me. He wanted me to be a Salafi and instilled the principles in me. 
We lived in Kuwait for a while when I was young and then he was a practicing Salafi, but 
now we are back in Alexandria and mosh mohtam (he does not care). 
 
Mahmoud explained what he meant by his father not caring by saying that “he does not pray, he 
does not have the practice of a Salafi himself anymore”, even though his father’s expectations of 
him and his siblings have not changed. He comes from Bacchus - a neighborhood in the outskirts 
of Alexandria derided for its widespread illiteracy and poverty. The mosque adjacent to 
Mahmoud’s apartment building was run by Da’wa Salafiyya sheikhs. They offered lessons for 
children and taught them Salafi Manhaj (methodology), but also kept them off the streets.
59
 
These lessons represented Mahmoud’s first exposure to the movement. As a result, both he and 
his friends grew to admire the sheikhs who spoke at the mosque, such as the famous sheikh 
Yasser Bohrami. Mahmoud’s description of the mosque’s interior alludes to an all-encompassing 
sensory experience and reflects his respect for the movement: “I love the long hours spent sitting 
in the mosque all together. Sitting all together, our shoulders almost touching. Squeezed 
together. The prayer room was small, used to get very warm and we would spend all day 
there.”60 
 
Mustafa 
 
Like Mahmoud, Mustafa is in his mid-twenties. He became a committed Salafi when he was 15 
years old, but he felt his faith “arise in him” during Ramadan when he was eight. He recalled that 
“I was staying in the mosque in Ibrahimiya for the last 10 days of Ramadan, barely leaving the 
mosque, praying all the time.”61 
The time he spent in the mosque over the years “changed his identity” which gave him 
greater self-confidence: “I truly liked the atmosphere of the mosque. I stayed for dhikr 
[remembrance sessions for the prophet Muhammad]. The shuyuk [religious leaders] were 
impressed by the intensity of my worship, they kept encouraging me”. He gradually started 
making longer visits to the mosque and even attended an institute in a Da’wa Salafiyya mosque 
for lessons on the Salaf, Qur’an recitation and Da’wa. As a result, he genuinely impressed the 
religious leaders with his Manhaj. 
 
Amr 
 
Amr grew up in a single-parent household in a neighborhood on the outskirts of Alexandria, 
working from a young age to help his mother feed the family. He does not appreciate the term 
‘Salafi’ because he sees it as a way of distinguishing him from other Muslims, who “are all one 
Umma [global community of Muslims]”. 
His story about becoming Salafi resembles a colorful religious epiphany. While working 
on a boat with German tourists off the Red Sea coast near the resort Sharm El-Sheikh, a violent 
storm gushed. The situation was so chaotic that he thought the boat would sink and they would 
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all die. According to his story, the tourists unexpectedly came up to the deck, bowed down to 
pray and started reciting the Qur’an. Realizing that only Allah could save them, Amr followed 
suit. He claims that the storm suddenly receded and all passengers survived. This is when he 
decided to become a Salafi and transform his way of life. He even claims that the German 
tourists also became Salafis and he remains in touch with some of them. 
My research shows that many Al Nour supporters active in the Da’wa Salafiyya are 
specifically trained at Da’wa and often share similar stories of religious revelation and 
conversion. They also often describe their lives before converting as sinful, perhaps in an attempt 
to relate with their interlocutors. Amr is actively involved in Da’wa, and specifically converting 
foreigners – something that his proficiency in English and insistence to teach me about Islamic 
practice indicates. While I cannot judge the veracity of Amr’s story, he sometimes struggled to 
elaborate on the dramatic events on the boat beyond his well-rehearsed short narrative. He was 
also unable to discuss the story’s significance to his religious and political identity. Similar to 
Mahmoud and Mustafa, Amr avoided talking about his own identity and instead described the 
religious customs of his neighborhood or his experience in the mosque. 
Amr was gradually exposed to the Da’wa Salafiyya and Al Nour’s discourse, and adopted 
the party’s discursive practices. Amr started reciting the Qu’ran in a mosque in his mother’s 
neighborhood, and at first he did not feel confident going out to do Da’wa, but then noted that if 
“you try inviting someone to Islam and it works, you will never stop”. When he does Da’wa, he 
emphasizes the messages of the sheikhs, such as Yasser Bohrami, who are also political leaders 
for Al Nour. He finds the act of Da’wa challenging and also very exciting. Amr differed from 
Mahmoud, Mustafa and other interviewees in that he was more intensely involved in Da’wa. He 
also admired members of the Da’wa Salafiyya who were known for their Da’wa expertise. He 
spoke with admiration about a sheikh in Alexandria, who has allegedly converted “more than 
120,000 individuals” to Salafism, and the important influence this religious leader has had on 
him. Amr now also walks through Alexandria with books on Islam in different foreign languages 
in case he encounters someone to whom he could preach.
62
 
 
Profiles like these give a window into practices that shape Salafi identity and affiliation. To be 
specific, proselytizing is an important responsibility for members of Da’wa Salafiyya, as the 
name of the organization indicates. The primary aim of the act of Da’wa is spreading the Salafi 
identity. However, the purpose of this discursive practice has been enhanced, as it is also used to 
mobilize other Salafis in support of Al Nour, which makes it an important part of the affiliation 
puzzle. This Da’wa consists of distributing flyers and books about Islam, correcting individuals’ 
prayers in the mosque, shaming men who do not wear beards and women who do not wear a 
hijab, or who are not modest enough in their veiling. The Da’wa Salafiyya has framed practices 
like voting, gluing Al Nour posters, passing flyers, encouraging others to support the party as 
Da’wa, justifying them with the expectation that they would contribute to the establishment of a 
Salafi social justice. 
The term Manhaj, which translates as ‘method’ or ‘methodology’ and is frequently used 
by Salafis to denote what they perceive as a coherent body of ritualistic practices, encompasses 
the discursive practices promoted by Al Nour. Gauvain interprets it as an overall ‘educational 
curriculum’ designed to enhance uniformity of the community. 63  The Manhaj promoted by 
Da’wa Salafiyya is not just one discursive practice, but a set of practices that includes very 
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intense prayer, strict dress code or disciplined study of Qur’an recitation, as well as support of Al 
Nour. Its deeply normative nature serves to reinforce Salafis’ sense of superiority over people 
who belong to other religious and social groups.
64
 In the words of Gauvain’s informants, Manhaj 
separates the “saved sect” from the others and makes the individual “ritually and morally 
purer.”65 The central role of Manhaj in the creation of a Salafi identity helps Al Nour encourage 
believers to affiliate with the party. For example, sheikhs tend to praise mosque-goers for their 
Manhaj and suggest that supporting Al Nour is a way to further improve it. This concurs with the 
argument that support for the party is due to more than solely the financial poverty or social 
marginalization of Alexandrians. 
While my observations suggest that the practice of Manhaj is promoted by politicians and 
sheikhs, ordinary Salafis often claim that they have embraced their Manhaj because they 
perceive it as embedded in individual agency. This independence goes beyond the enactment of 
correct Manhaj: “We are the motor of social change. Unlike the Brotherhood, Salafis do not 
come from powerful ikhwan [brothers] families. We are often ‘self-made Salafis’”, as one 
informant put it.
66
 Some supporters emphasize the fact that Al Nour does not have an official 
murshid (religious guide) or mufti (legal cleric), to indicate that Da’wa Salafiyya Salafis are 
more autonomous. This perceived agency was very important in their decision to remain Salafis; 
as one explained, “you manage your religion according to Islamic rules, no need for a guide, you 
have your mind, Allah gave it to you so that you can manage yourself and your learning”.67 
Different Imams and sheikhs speak in the name of the Da’wa Salafiyya, but none claims to be 
‘the one Al Nour sheikh’.68 This absence of a single, leading religious figure within Al Nour, and 
this perception of the Da’wa Salafiyya as an accessible community, which is less hierarchical 
than the Muslim Brotherhood, is likely empowering to many Salafis and appears to be an 
additional motivation for Salafis to support the party.
69
 
In his study of Islamist revivalism and its appeal to the Egyptian youth, Schielke argues 
that Islamist movements manage to mobilize large segments of society because of their promise 
of clarity and happiness embedded in agency. He concludes his research with a crucial statement: 
“what makes the Salafi revivalist piety so peculiar, and so successful—and in practice so 
troubling—is that it excludes the possibility of discussing its success”.70 The fault or eventual 
failure of the ideology falls on the believer, who is culpable for not correctly emulating the salaf 
and for enacting a weak Manhaj. As such, the structure and promise of Salafism in fact 
emphasizes personal responsibility perhaps freeing the Salafi movement from ‘accountability’ to 
its members. 
The two sets of rituals—Da’wa and Manhaj—are discursive practices constructed 
through the daily routine. Al Nour Salafis believe that by doing Da’wa and having Manhaj they 
‘change society’ (takhyir almugtama’). This allows them to attach the ideology of Salafi social 
justice to the regular practices that have grown out of an accepted habitus. The process of 
mobilization of Al Nour’s supporters generally agrees with Bourdieu’s theory about group 
formation in the context of political struggle. On the basis of his ethnographic study of the 
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Kabylia in North Africa, Bourdieu argues that the naming of dormant identities takes place in 
response to “people’s malaise, anxiety, disquiet, expectations”.71 In the case of Al Nour, these 
collective grievances are caused by the perceived or real instances of marginalization and 
discrimination against Salafis. 
 
 
Female Salafis 
 
Female Salafis are the most complex category to address and possibly the area where the most 
pressing need for extensive ethnographic research lies. Women have been largely absent from 
my analysis in this paper so far. I had the opportunity to talk to only a few women in a formal 
interview setting, yet a common finding at this stage is that most Salafi women who I 
encountered call themselves ‘non-political’, declaring that they are not involved with political 
activities and cannot speak on behalf of Al Nour. 
Salafi women are not embedded in the same milieus, or mosques, as the Salafi men and 
have developed different discursive practices. Da’wa Salafiyya mosques do not usually have a 
prayer section or bathrooms for women, thus women tend to pray at home. I can hypothesize that 
Salafi women have a more private Salafi habitus. Also, somewhat surprisingly, some of the 
Salafi women I interviewed talk of their niqab as one of the first descriptive elements of their 
‘Salafiness’. One said: “I am Salafi. Yes, I wear a black niqab, I pray and I am trying to bring up 
my kids in an Islamic atmosphere.”72 It is difficult to say why they emphasize their clothing. Is it 
that the externally developed stereotypes of Salafi women have been internalized, or that my 
interactions with female informants were too limited for them to open up and reveal more 
complex understandings of their religious and social identity? When asked about their Salafi 
identity, males, unlike females, usually make statements about the origins of Salafism and 
explain the relationship between their religious and political identities. They also discuss the 
Umma, denoting a global perspective on Salafism. 
These women’s claims about their identity do not substantiate some of the scholarly 
debates occurring within the realm of Islamic feminism literature. For example, many Muslim 
feminists criticize all too common political and academic debates that reduce Muslim women to 
their physical appearance or dress,
73
 and label arguments based solely on garments as 
essentializing.
74
 Historically, ethnographers have often assumed that in MENA “there are dual 
and separate worlds of men and women in which the former world is public and the latter is 
private”. 75  Even if men and women experience a different Salafi habitus, I am wary of 
perpetuating the representation of the women’s world in Muslim-majority societies as 
unescapably “domestic, narrow, and restricted” in opposition to men’s world which is “political, 
broad, expansive”. 76 How female Salafis adopt or adapt the prescribed discursive practices of the 
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Al Nour might be unique and complex. Gauvain’s research indicates that it is the potential to 
challenge male hierarchies that attracts many women to Salafism,
77
 yet this might not necessarily 
apply to my informants. My fieldwork at this point is not sufficient to decipher the potential 
complexity of female Salafi affiliation, or the areas of negotiated gender roles within Salafi 
political parties. 
Salafi women may act in a ‘non-political’ manner in relation to Al Nour because they are 
actually following the party’s recommendations. The Al Nour politicians describe appropriate 
female conduct as staying away from the political process (aside from simply voting) and 
embracing their traditional role in the household. Al Nour’s original platform claimed that 
women, children and men are all equal in front of God. However, the politicians I interviewed 
generally avoided addressing the issue of women’s rights or of women’s role in any real depth. 
For example, when I prompted Hamad about the role of women in the party, he delivered a 
diatribe about the hypersexualisation of young women in Europe and North America, but made 
no comments about the status of women in his party or in Egypt more generally. 
For most Salafis, the discursive practice of Da’wa was central to their personal mission, 
yet the limited number of Salafi women I interviewed generally understood Da’wa to be enacted, 
rather than spoken. According to Toth’s concept of “the three Jihads”, Al Nour politicians 
embrace an activism of the word - Jihad bi al-Kalima. Salafi women, however, arguably enact an 
activism of the heart - Jihad bi al-Qalb, through which “their own personal practices, beliefs, and 
identity are subjectively re-oriented to conform to the movement’s definition of what is 
correct”.78 Fatima, speaking to me on the phone from a town on the Red Sea, reflected on being 
surrounded with Egyptians and tourists of different religions and argued that her responsibilities 
as a Salafi (Da’wa) do not include proselytizing. Fatima’s Da’wa is contained in her actions, and 
she says she sets an example of proper Salafi behavior. 
In the future, as Al Nour expands and attempts to mobilize more Salafis, it will be 
interesting to see if the party will change its discourse to try to actively reach out to women. Will 
it encourage them to become involved in more public types of discursive practices? For now, 
Salafi politicians have been inconsistent in their prescriptions and actions. They had to put 
female names on their electoral lists to comply with electoral law, yet more generally they did 
not express the desire to see them involved in the political process. Badran confirms that 
Islamists and Salafis have a contradictory and mixed legacy of sanctioning women’s 
participation in politics. Islamists tend to support women’s right to vote, but oppose women’s 
potential election to all political positions.
79
 As Roald points out, in countries where women 
voters can also be elected, such as Kuwait or Egypt for example, this presents a constitutional 
problem for Salafis.
80
 Generally speaking, Salafi women appear to have a different habitus which 
implies distinctive responsibilities. Al Nour has been ambiguous towards their involvement in 
politics but has usually excluded women from its discursive practices, with female political 
participation generally restricted to voting. Salafi women’s discursive practices include Da’wa 
and Manhaj, yet they are aimed at reinforcing their own faith, rather than supporting Al Nour as 
a political party. 
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Conclusion 
 
By using ethnographic methods and analyzing the narratives of my informants to study 
Salafi affiliation, I have been forced to mostly deviate from existing social movement theories 
and instead consider through different anthropological concepts the complex dynamics of Salafi 
affiliation in Alexandria. Using Bourdieu’s seminal concept ‘habitus’, I argued that the Da’wa 
Salafiyya social movement, whose political expression is Al Nour, has not mobilized 
Alexandrians merely because they are poor or marginalized. While Salafis who support Al Nour 
often have socioeconomic grievances, the main driver of Al Nour’s popular appeal is the 
discourse of Salafi social justice leveraged by Al Nour politicians, who are also leaders in the 
Da’wa Salafiyya. Politicians tend to be educated in Egyptian universities and live comfortable 
lives as professionals, which is common across political parties in general. Yet as far as 
supporters are concerned, none of the ones I have interviewed for this research were part of the 
Egyptian bourgeoisie.
81
 Instead, they usually came from different backgrounds that ranged from 
the urban poor all the way to the upper middle class. Their shared characteristics revolved around 
their relation to and respect for Salafi sheikhs, their affiliation to specific mosques, and their 
embracing of certain discourses, more so than solely their ‘social class’. A rigorous household 
survey of neighborhoods where support for Al Nour is estimated to be high could serve to 
answer this question clearly in quantitative terms, yet it goes without saying that, in the current 
political context, securing the necessary permissions for such a study would be almost 
unimaginable. 
The supporters I interviewed who were mobilized in the mosques controlled by the 
movement became attracted to the party by its empowering discourse of Salafi social justice. 
These supporters have gradually extended their Salafi religious practices, such as their emphasis 
on Da’wa or the enactment of holistic Manhaj, to include political elements in support of Al 
Nour. Their actions are aimed at religious self-improvement as Salafis, but also at reestablishing 
Salafi social justice by supporting Al Nour. This transition from religious praxis to political 
affiliation is not reproduced identically for all Salafis, as many refuse to support Al Nour while 
others assert themselves as non-political Salafis, including Salafi women who have adopted 
distinctive discursive practices. 
Even though the results from Egypt’s parliamentary elections are contested, Salafis are 
now manifestly influential players in local and national politics, as well as in civic and religious 
life. Lacroix attests to this: “reproducing the pre-Arab Spring policy of ignoring the Islamists—
including Egypt’s Salafis—can only be counter-productive”.82 Yet recognizing the reality of 
Salafis’ political influence does not imply endorsing their values and practices, which are seen as 
oppressive by many groups in Egyptian society. 
Further research on Salafism in Egypt could benefit from a detailed analysis of 
socioeconomic data on Al Nour supporters and voters. Another research opportunity in the area 
would be to conduct more extensive ethnographic studies of Salafism in rural communities, or 
focusing on migrant workers who have returned from the Gulf. Additional research on Salafi 
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women would also address the current scarcity of ethnographic data on this group. Given that the 
relationship between the Da’wa Salafiyya and Al Nour is constantly reshaped in this new 
political context to ensure survival and avoid repression, there is a need for research on both the 
tensions and the continuing links between the two organizations.  
Almost three years after the Revolution, the self-professed purity of the Al Nour 
politicians has become tarnished. This is especially due to the media’s focus on several Al Nour 
scandals
83
 which have caused the ranks of pious Salafis to become ambivalent about the 
democratic process. Is the discourse of the Al Nour politicians sustainable if they continue to 
lose personal credibility? How will supporters react in an election after Al Nour has denounced 
the Brotherhood vehemently and supported the army during the protests in the summer of 2013? 
One thing is certain: the extension of Salafi religious practices to include political actions has 
abruptly propelled the movement into a new realm where religious meaning is adapted on a daily 
basis to justify a political project. This transformative process is likely to continue in the future. 
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